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Tribal Energy Resource Agreements:
The Unintended “Great Mischief for Indian
Energy Development” and the Resulting Need
for Reform
ELIZABETH ANN KRONK*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Today, escaping stories of political acrimony seems
impossible. Despite this intense atmosphere, the majority of
Americans seem to agree that finding new sources of energy is a
national priority.1 These same citizens also believe that the
United States is failing to adequately develop its domestic energy
resources.2 President Obama has made statements on numerous
occasions indicating his strong support for the development of
new energy sources, especially alternative energies.3 The GOP
*Assistant Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law. J.D., University
of Michigan School of Law; B.S., Cornell University. This article is dedicated to
Professor David Getches, who walked on from this world on July 5, 2011. Thank
you for teaching me, inspiring me and making the world a better place for all.
The author would also like to thank Texas Tech University Law Librarian
Eugenia Charles-Newton for her excellent research assistance.
I also
appreciated the helpful revisions and comments from Professor Chris Kulander,
Mrs. Charles-Newton, Connor Warner, and Jessica Zalin.
1. See 81% Say Finding New Energy Sources is Urgent National Need,
RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/
public_content/politics/current_events/environment_energy/81_say_finding_new
_energy_sources_is_urgent_national_need [hereinafter 81% Say Finding New
Energy Sources].
2. See 75% Say U.S. Not Doing Enough To Develop Its Gas And Oil
Resources,
RASMUSSEN
REPORTS
(June
29,
2011),
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/enviro
nment_energy/75_say_u_s_not_doing_enough_to_develop_its_gas_and_oil_resou
rces. (Providing that:
Most voters continue to feel America needs to do more to develop
domestic gas and oil resources. They also still give the edge to
finding new sources of oil over reducing gas and oil consumption. . . .
just 19% believe the United States does enough to develop its own
gas and oil resources. Seventy-five percent . . . do not think the
country is doing enough in this area.).
3. See Macon Phillips, President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address, THE
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 21, 2009, 1:27 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
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also supports energy independence.4 Such widespread support
for the development of domestic energy resources may exist5
because the issue directly relates to national security.6 As the
foreign regions that the United States has typically relied upon
for fossil fuels become increasingly unstable,7 domestic energy
resources must remain available in order to support the
American populace and economy. In response to these opinions
and pressures, the United States is already actively engaged in
diversifying its energy asset portfolio and searching for domestic
sources of energy.8 “As David Rothkopf, a Carnegie Endowment
inaugural-address (“[A]nd each day brings further evidence that the ways we
use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet. . . . We will
harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our
factories.”); see also 81% Say Finding New Energy Sources, supra note 1 (“‘For
the sake of our economy, our security and the future of our planet, we must end
the age of oil in our time,’ Democrat Barack Obama said . . . . Obama champions
the development of renewable energy sources like wind and solar . . . ”); see also
Tracey A. LeBeau, The Green Road Ahead: Renewable Energy Takes a Stumble
But is on the Right Path, Possibly Right Through Indian Country, 56 FED. LAW.
38, 40 (2009) (“[A] new administration has its sights on utilizing the renewable
sector as the linchpin in its economic plans to move the United States, once
again, into a new economic era – the age of green energy.”).
4. See Current Political Issues: Energy, REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,
http://www.gop.com/index.php/issues/issues
(“We
believe
in
energy
independence. We support an ‘all of the above’ approach that encourages the
production of nuclear power, clean coal, natural gas, solar, wind, geothermal,
hydropower, as well as offshore drilling in an environmentally responsible
way.”).
5. See Tracey A. LeBeau, Energy Security and Increasing North American
Oil and Gas Production, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 193, 193 (2002)
[hereinafter Energy Security].
6. See id. (“The combination of the new war on terrorism, domestic economic
pressures, and increasing tensions in the Middle East has heightened the
concern of many legislators and the Bush administration on the United States’
reliance on foreign, and potentially unreliable, sources of oil, a concern
expressed as an energy security risk.”).
7. See CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
6 (2007), available at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/news/FlipBooks/
Climate%20Change%20web/flipviewerxpress.html (“Climate change acts as a
threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.
Projected climate change will seriously exacerbate already marginal living
standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations, causing
widespread political instability and the likelihood of failed states.”).
8. See LeBeau, supra note 3, at 39 (Providing that:
Last year witnessed record growth, retraction, and gyrations in
investment and financing activity in the renewable energy sectors.
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scholar, recently noted, ‘Making America the world’s greenest
country is not a selfless act of charity or naïve moral indulgence.
It is now a core national security and economic interest.’”9
Given this need to grow and to diversify the American energy
portfolio and an American public that generally supports
developing domestic energy resources, politicians are increasingly
likely to look domestically to incorporate a variety of sources and
types of energy into America’s energy portfolio. When looking for
potential domestic energy resources, Indian country10 stands
out.11 Former Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell made the
connection between the need for domestic energy production and
Indian country when he stated:
I think America has to kick the habit on depending on foreign
energy and start producing more of its own energy. One answer

It has been estimated that, when the final numbers come in, the
capacity of new wind generation in 2008 will have reached nearly
7,500 megawatts (at least 35 percent of new capacity added),
bringing total installed wind capacity in the United States to about
24,000 mega-watts. According to some estimates, the solar industry
will have nearly double installations of solar photovoltaic modules
that same year.) (citations omitted)
See also Andrea S. Miles, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: Tools for
Achieving Energy Development and Tribal Self-Sufficiency or an Abdication of
Federal Environmental and Trust Responsibilities?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 461
(2005-2006).
9. LeBeau, supra note 3, at 41.
10. The term “Indian Country” refers to specific areas of land, defined as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through
the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state,
and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
11. See LeBeau, supra note 3, at 42 (“The road to an area of great promise for
a sustainable renewable energy market leads directly to – and through – Indian
Country. Indian reservations, especially throughout the western United States,
are rich in conventional energy resources that remain largely undeveloped.”); see
also Miles, supra note 8, at 462.
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to our energy future is in the domestic production, and I just
don’t mean in ANWR either. . . .
. . . Indian-owned energy resources are still largely
undeveloped – 1.81 million acres are being explored or in
production, but about 15 million more acres of energy resources
are undeveloped. . . .
There are 90 tribes that own significant energy resources,
both renewable and nonrenewable.12

Former Senator Campbell is not alone in his belief that
substantial energy resources exist within Indian country. “The
Bureau of Indian Affairs estimates that while Indian land
comprises only five percent of the land area in the United States,
it contains an estimated ten percent of all energy resources in the
United States.”13 With regard to traditional energy sources,
“Native American reservations contain large reserves of oil and
gas. There are an estimated 890 million barrels of oil and natural
gas liquids, and 5.5 trillion cubic feet of gas on tribal lands.”14 In

12. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act and the Native American Energy
Development and Self-Determination Act: Hearing on S. 424 and S. 522 Before
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Sen. Ben
Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs) [hereinafter
Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing].
13. DOUGLAS C. MACCOURT, RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN
COUNTRY: A HANDBOOK FOR TRIBES 1 (2010); see also Judith V. Royster,
Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy
Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065, 106667 (2008); see also Energy Policy Act of 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S5,751 (daily ed.
May 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman) (“[E]nergy resources on Indian
land in the U.S. have not been as extensively developed as they might be.
According to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, over 90 Indian reservations have
significant untapped energy resource potential. That includes oil and gas, coal,
coalbed methane, wind and geothermal resources.”).
14. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 73
(statement of Vicky Bailey, Assistant Sec’y for Policy and Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of
Energy); see also 149 CONG. REC. S7459 (daily ed. June 5, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
Even though in one year alone over 9.3 million barrels of oil, 229
billion cubic feet of natural gas, and 21 million tons of coal were
produced from Indian land, representing $700 million in Indian
energy revenue, the Department of Interior estimates that only 25
percent of the oil and less than 20 percent of all natural gas reserves
on Indian land have been fully developed.
Id.
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addition to traditional energy resources, Indian country also has
substantial potential for development of alternative energy
resources. In particular, there is huge potential for wind15 and
solar16 energy development within certain regions of Indian
country. As a result, “Indian tribes stand in a unique nexus
between renewable energy resources and transmission of
electricity in key areas of the West.”17
Recognizing the potential key role that tribes will play in the
development of the country’s energy resources, both the
Department of Energy (DOE) and some in Congress recognize
that Indian tribes should be included in plans to develop these
energy resources.18 As a result, “[w]hile the movement toward
energy independence is an important opportunity for tribes, the
present political climate also offers tremendous opportunities for
tribes to use their renewable resources to enter into the powerproducer market and play an important role in regional and
national energy planning.”19
Mirroring this desire, many tribes are also becoming
interested in energy development opportunities:
Perhaps more importantly, tribes are beginning to perceive
renewable energy development in a positive light, as something
15. MACCOURT, supra note 13, at 1-2 (“NREL has estimated that there is the
potential for about 535 billion kWh/year of wind energy alone available on
Indian lands in the contiguous 48 states, which is equivalent to 14 percent of
current U.S. total annual energy generation.”); Kathleen R. Unger, Change is in
the Wind: Self-Determination and Wind Power Through Tribal Energy Resource
Agreements, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 329, 334 (2009) (“Tribal lands have substantial
wind resources. The Energy Information Administration has identified almost
one hundred reservations with winds great enough for energy development
projects. Reservations on the Great Plains offer approximately 200 gigawatts of
wind power potential – roughly one-third of the electrical capacity for the entire
nation.”) (citations omitted); Donald M. Clary, Commercial-Scale Renewable
Energy Projects on Tribal Lands, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 19, 19 (2011).
16. MACCOURT, supra note 13, at 2 (“NREL estimates that there is also
17,600 billion kWh/year of solar energy potential on Indian lands in the lower 48
states; this amount is equivalent to 4.5 times the total U.S. electrical generation
in 2004.”).
17. LeBeau, supra note 3, at 44.
18. Debbie Leonard, Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Law of Federal Reserved
Water Rights: The Potential Impact on Renewable Energy Development, 50 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 611, 638 (2010).
19. Id.
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that is consistent with tribal culture and values. Many tribal
leaders now see renewable energy as a vehicle for economic
development in areas that may no longer be (or never were)
suitable for agricultural development. Some also see this as a
way for tribes to play a positive role in the nation’s energy
future.20

Accordingly, energy development in Indian country is attractive
to the federal government. It both advances the federal interests
discussed above, and provides some tribes a method to achieve
economic diversification, promote tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination, and provide employment and other economic
assistance to tribal members.
Despite the foregoing, extensive energy development within
Indian country has yet to happen. Former Senator Campbell
explained why this may be the case:
The answer lies partly in the fact that energy resource
development is by its very nature capital intensive. Most tribes
do not have the financial resources to fund extensive energy
projects on their own and so must partner with private industry,
or other outside entities, by leasing out their energy resources for
development in return for royalty payments. . . . The unique legal
and political relationship between the United States and Indian
tribes sometime makes this leasing process cumbersome.
....
The Committee on Indian Affairs has been informed over the
year that the Secretarial approval process is often so lengthy that
outside parties, who otherwise would like to partner with Indian
tribes to develop their energy resources are reluctant to become
entangled in the bureaucratic red tape that inevitably
accompanies the leasing of Tribal resources.21

Recognizing the importance of energy development in Indian
country, the need to promote such development, and the fact that
the existing structure for energy development in Indian country
may actually act as a disincentive to private investors, Congress

20. Donald M. Clary, Commercial-Scale Renewable Energy Projects on Tribal
Lands, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 19, 23 (2011).
21. 149 CONG. REC. S7459-60 (daily ed. June 5, 2003) (statement of Senator
Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
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passed the Indian Tribal Energy Development and SelfDetermination Act of 2005 as part of the Energy Policy Act of
2005.22 In relevant part, the Act allows tribes who have met
certain requirements to “enter into a lease or business agreement
for the purpose of energy resource development on tribal land”
without review by or approval of the Secretary of the Interior,
which would otherwise be required under applicable federal
law.23 In order to qualify, a tribe must enter into a Tribal Energy
Resource Agreement (TERA) with the Secretary of the Interior.24
The Secretary must approve the TERA if the tribe meets several
requirements.25 One of these requirements is of particular
importance to this article. Tribes are required to “establish
requirements for environmental review,”26 which must mirror the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).27 In addition, the Indian Tribal Energy Development
22. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, tit. V, 119 Stat. 594, 763779 (2005).
23. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (2006).
24. Id. § 3504(b).
25. Id. § 3504(e).
26. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(VI).
27. At a minimum, tribes must include the following in the environmental
review provisions contained within a TERA:
(i) the identification and evaluation of all significant environmental
effects (as compared to a no-action alternative), including effects on
cultural resources;
(ii) the identification of proposed mitigation measures, if any, and
incorporation of appropriate mitigation measures into the lease,
business agreement, or right-of-way;
(iii) a process for ensuring that –
(I) The public is informed of, and has an opportunity to comment on,
the environmental impacts of the proposed action; and
(II) Responses to relevant and substantive comments are provided,
before tribal approval of the lease, business agreement, or right-ofway;
(iv) sufficient administrative support and technical capability to
carry out the environmental review process; and
(v) oversight by the Indian tribe of energy development activities by
any other party under any lease, business agreement, or right-of-way
entered into pursuant to the tribal energy resource agreement, to
determine whether the activities are in compliance with the tribal
energy resource agreement and applicable Federal environmental
laws.

7

818

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

and Self-Determination Act of 2005 expounds upon the federal
government’s trust responsibility to tribes as related to TERAs.
Specifically, the Act states:
[N]othing in this section shall absolve the United States from any
responsibility to Indians or Indian tribes, including, but not
limited to, those which derive from the trust relationship or from
any treaties, statutes, and other laws of the United States,
Executive orders, or agreements between the United States and
any Indian tribe.28

However, the Act goes on to provide that “the United States shall
not be liable to any party (including any Indian tribe) for any
negotiated term of, or any loss resulting from the negotiated
terms of, a lease, business agreement, or right-of-way executed
pursuant to and in accordance with a tribal energy resource
agreement.”29
The Act’s mandated environmental review,
statement on the federal government’s trust responsibility, and
general waiver of the federal government’s liability will all be
discussed in much greater detail below as they relate to why
tribes have not taken advantage of the Act’s TERA provisions.
From the text of the Act, it may be inferred that Congress
hoped to promote energy development in Indian country by
“streamlining” the bureaucratic process (i.e., removing the
requirement of Secretarial approval for tribes that enter into a
TERA with the Department of Interior). In 2003, Senator
Domenici confirmed this conclusion, explaining the purpose of the
then-proposed TERA provisions as follows:
The Indian people of the United States are the proprietors of
large amounts of property. On this property and in this property
lie various assets and resources . . . .
[T]he purpose of this bill will be to say to our Indian people, if
you want to develop resources in the field of energy that lie
within your lands, we are giving you the authority to do so and
hopefully in a streamlined manner so that it will not be forever
bogged down in the red-tape and bureaucracy of Indian lands

Id. § 3504(e)(2)(C).
28. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(B).
29. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii).
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Tribal representatives initially indicated support for the TERA
provisions, as the TERAs allowed for increased tribal selfdetermination and also encouraged efficiency in energy
development in Indian country.31
In addition to tribal and federal governmental interests in
the TERA provisions, third party investors may also be interested
in TERAs, because “[i]f a TERA is properly structured, a mineral
developer should gain greater certainty and efficiency in the
development of energy resources on tribal lands.”32 In this way,
the TERA provisions represent a rare instance in the history of
tribal-federal relations where both tribes and the federal
government may benefit from a partnership. However, despite

30. 149 CONG. REC. S5748 (daily ed. May 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Pete
Domenici).
31. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 104
(statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation); see also Letter from
Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, to Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell
(Apr. 9, 2003) (available at Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra
note 12, at 108) (“Generally speaking, the concept of turning tribal resource
management over to tribes while ‘eliminating’ federal oversight would seem to
be a very simple infusion of sovereignty into the current statutory and
regulatory scheme governing tribal resource development. The Navajo Nation
certainly supports this general concept.”).
32. Scot W. Anderson, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE, The Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005: Opportunities
for Cooperative Ventures 3 (2005), available at http://www.dgslaw.com/
documents/articles/670412.pdf. Mr. Anderson went on to explain why this is the
case, stating:
The TERA is also an opportunity for a tribe to market its commercial
and legal environment to potential mineral developers. A TERA can
assure investors of a stable investment environment by describing
and incorporating an appropriate limited waiver of the Tribe’s
defense of sovereign immunity, and by setting forth a clearly defined
process for resolving disputes. The certainty provided by a TERA
can assist energy developers and tribes in securing financing for
energy projects on tribal lands.
Many investors and energy
developers also want to know that they have an [sic] clear way to
exit from a project. The TERA can set forth rules and principles
governing the assignment and transfer of interest, and in that
manner assist energy developers in designing their exit strategy.
Id. at 16.
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this possibility, not a single tribe has taken advantage of the
“streamlining” opportunity presented by the TERA provisions.
Despite the attractiveness of increased energy development
in Indian country, tribes have failed to take advantage of the
existing TERA provisions because they represent a mixture of
federal paternalism, oversight, and limited liability that is not
attractive to tribes. This article examines more deeply why tribes
have, to date, failed to take advantage of the TERA provisions
and then makes recommendations as to how TERA might be
reformed in order to increase tribal participation. Accordingly,
Section II examines the underlying purpose of the TERA
provisions and associated legislative history. Three categories of
tribal concerns related to the TERA provisions emerge following a
review of the applicable legislative history. Each of these
categories is explored in depth. Next, Section III discusses the
general ability of tribes to develop their energy resources. This
Section also discusses why such development may be generally
attractive to tribes. The Section concludes that some tribes have
both the capacity to, and economic interest in, developing their
energy resources. Given the foregoing, Section IV theorizes that
tribes have failed to enter into TERA agreements due to the
concerns represented in the related legislative history. As a
result, Section V presents two alternative proposals for reform,
arguing that should either proposal be adopted by Congress, the
likelihood that tribes would be willing to enter into TERA
agreements would increase. Ultimately, this article concludes
that adoption of either of the proposed TERA reforms will spur
tribal promulgation of TERAs with the Secretary of Interior.
II.

PURPOSE OF AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
RELATED TO TRIBAL ENERGY RESOURCE
AGREEMENTS

In order to better understand the TERA provisions and
identify potential tribal concerns with the provisions, review of
the legislative history behind enactment of the TERA provisions
is helpful. Although legislative history is limited in that it does
not reflect the understanding of all members of Congress, it may
assist in understanding the issues raised in Congress as related
to the TERA provisions. Moreover, considering the legislative

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/4
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history behind the TERA provisions aids in understanding what a
few key congressmen, such as then-Senators Bingaman (D-NM)
and Campbell (R-CO), hoped to accomplish by incorporating the
TERA provisions into the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
As an initial starting point, bills submitted by both Senators
Bingaman and Campbell in 2002 served as the basis for the
TERA provisions;33 these bills were revised and resubmitted for
consideration in 2003. On March 19, 2003, the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs held a hearing on two proposed amendments to
the then-pending draft Energy Policy Act of 2005.34 On February
14, 2003, Senator Bingaman introduced S. 424, “To Establish,
Reauthorize, and Improve Energy Programs Relating to Indian
Tribes.”35 On March 5, 2003, Senator Campbell introduced S.
522, “To Amend the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to Assist Indian
Tribes in Developing Energy Resources.”36
In addition to wanting to promote domestic energy
production, Congress seemingly also intended to promote tribal
sovereignty and self-determination by enacting the Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005.37
Theresa Rosier, Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs within the Department of Interior, explained that “[w]e
[the Department of Interior] are supportive of having tribes have
more self-determination and have more responsibility in the
development of renewable and nonrenewable energies on their
lands.”38 In an effort to help promote tribal self-determination
and to make energy development in Indian country easier and
more efficient,39 Congress adopted the Act to help streamline the
process of energy development within Indian country.

33. See 149 CONG. REC. S7460 (daily ed. June 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Ben
Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs); 149 CONG. REC.
S7684 (daily ed. June 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman).
34. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 1
(statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Miles, supra note 8.
38. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Hearing, supra note 12, at 76 (statement of
Theresa Rosier, Counselor to the Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Dep’t of the
Interior).
39. See Unger, supra note 15.
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A review of the legislative history associated with specific
aspects of the Act suggests that concerns related to the TERA
provisions can generally be grouped into one of three categories,
including: (1) the tribal trust relationship; (2) the institution of
mandatory tribal environmental review provisions; and (3) the
waiver of the federal government’s liability once a tribe has
entered into a TERA. At the outset of congressional discussion of
the pending legislation, Senator Bingaman expressed his
concerns related to two of these categories:
Unfortunately, in my view, the provisions have been marred by a
proposal to make energy leasing on Indian lands both exempt
from environmental analysis under NEPA, and exempt from the
normal trust protections afforded Indian tribes. I fear this is a
substantial flaw that needs to be addressed if the bill is to keep
its balance among energy, environment, and the public
interest.40

Accordingly, to better understand why tribes have been reticent
to adopt TERAs, the discussion below more fully explores the
legislative history related to these two categories, as well as the
third category of the waiver of the federal government’s liability.
A. Federal Trust Responsibility to Tribes
Several comments related to the TERA provisions focused on
the potential impacts of the then-proposed provisions on the
federal government’s trust responsibility to federally-recognized
tribes.41 In order to understand the legal context of these

40. 149 CONG. REC. S5751 (daily ed. May 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff
Bingaman).
41. There are generally thought to be three categories of claims that can be
brought by tribes against the federal government. These three categories
include: (1) general trust claims; (2) bare/limited trust claims; and (3) full trust
claims. The cases discussed infra, Cherokee Nation, Worcester, Kagama and
Lone Wolf, may be used as the basis to form a claim under the first category of
trust responsibility cases – a general trust claim. Based on these cases and the
historic relationship between the federal government and federally recognized
tribes, it may be argued that liability exists. However, a claim based on a
general trust responsibility is usually unsuccessful if the sole basis of the claim
is the federal government’s general trust responsibility to tribes. Later, the
Court recognized a second category of liability under the federal trust
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questions, one must understand the federal trust responsibility to
tribes.
B. Historical Development of the Federal Trust
Responsibility to Tribes
Understanding the history and nuances of the trust
responsibility to federally recognized tribes is critical in
understanding the legislative history behind the TERA
provisions.42 One must look to three foundational cases of federal
responsibility – a claim for breach of a bare or limited trust responsibility. In
1980, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980)
[hereinafter Mitchell I]. In Mitchell I, the Court considered whether the
Secretary of the Interior was liable under section 5 of the General Allotment
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 348, for an alleged breach of trust related to the management of
timber resources and related funds. Id. at 537-38. Although the General
Allotment Act included language that land was to be held “in trust,” the Court
concluded that this language only created a bare trust responsibility because the
Act did not require that the federal government manage the land. Id. at 542-43.
Because the Act did not place any affirmative management duties on the federal
government, the Court held in favor of the Secretary. Id. at 545. However, in
1983, the Court considered a related breach of trust claim from the same tribe in
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) [hereinafter Mitchell II]. Mitchell
II differed from Mitchell I, however, because in Mitchell II the tribe based its
claim on several statutes that had not been at issue in Mitchell I, arguing that
these statutes created an affirmative duty for the Secretary to manage the lands
in question. Id. at 210-11. The Court agreed with the tribe, finding that the
statutes in question “clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to
manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the Indians.” Id. at 224.
Having determined liability for the breach of trust, the Court then turned to
private trust law precedent to determine the extent of the federal government’s
liability, as the statutes did not expressly require compensation. Id. at 226. The
Court’s decision in Mitchell II is an example of the third category of trust cases –
a claim based on a full trust responsibility.
42. In fact, Senator Inouye provided substantial explanation of the history
and legal importance of the federal trust responsibility when discussing the
then-proposed amendments by Senators Campbell and Bingaman:
The large body of Federal Indian law is known as trust
responsibility, and it was first given expression by the Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, John Marshall, in 1832. This
relationship is premised upon the sovereignty of the Indian nations,
a sovereignty that existed well before the U.S. government was
formed, and it is memorialized in the United States Constitution.
This trust relationship that has always formed the course of
dealings between the U.S. and Indian tribes is well understood and
beyond debate. The United States holds legal title to lands that it
held in trust for Indian tribes. Accordingly, activities affecting
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Indian law, also known as the Marshall Trilogy,43 in order to
comprehend the genesis of the modern federal trust
responsibility.44 Two of the three cases, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia45 and Worcester v. Georgia,46 are particularly important
in this regard.
Cherokee Nation recognized the separate
Indian lands and resources have always been the subject of approval
by the Secretary of the Interior Department, acting as the principal
agent for the United States. . . .
In the Congress, we have always understood the United States
trust responsibility as being derived from treaties, statutes,
regulations, executive orders, rulings and agreements between the
Federal Government and Indian tribal governments. . . .
...
With the Government’s advocacy for a new perspective on the
United States trust responsibility, it is readily apparent why the
eyes of Indian country are sharply focused on the tribal provisions of
this bill and the amendments that are the subject of our discussion
today.
Native America wants to see what position the Congress will
adopt as it relates to the ongoing viability of the trust relationship.
They are closely scrutinizing our words and our actions in the
context of this measure to determine whether they signal a
departure from the traditional and well-established principles of the
United States trust responsibility.
149 CONG. REC. S7687-88 (daily ed. June 11, 2001).
43. The “Marshall Trilogy” is a reference to Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall
Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. Rev. 627 (1964).
44. The first of these cases, Johnson v. McIntosh, has less direct relevance to
this discussion than the other two cases. This case raised the question of
whether land grants made by tribal chiefs before the passage of the Trade and
Intercourse Acts were valid. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 54345 (1823). The Court held that these grants were invalid because the Doctrine
of Discovery conveyed title to Great Britain, as the conquering European
sovereign, and the United States of America obtained title to all land when it
succeeded from Great Britain. Id. at 587-88. As a result, American Indians only
retained a right of occupancy in the land. Id. at 592; see also Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832).
45. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). In Cherokee Nation, the
Court addressed whether its original jurisdiction extended to Indian nations. In
holding that it did not, the Court reasoned that Indian nations were not foreign
nations, but, rather, “domestic dependent nations.” Id. at 17.
46. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). In Worcester, the Court
considered whether the laws of Georgia applied within the territory of the
Cherokee Nation. The Court concluded that the laws of Georgia had no force or
effect within Indian country.
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sovereignty of tribal nations.47 At the same time, however, Chief
Justice Marshall explained that in many respects, tribal nations
had given up aspects of their external sovereignty to the federal
government.48 Worcester held that the laws of states generally do
not apply in Indian country.49 Taken together, Cherokee Nation
and Worcester stand for several important principles. First, in
becoming “dependent” nations, tribes became reliant on the
federal government and, therefore, the federal government owed
tribal nations external protection. Second, because of this
historical relationship between tribal nations and the federal
government, the relationship is primarily of a federal character.
The United States Supreme Court was relatively silent on
the issue of federal Indian law following its decision in Worcester
until the Major Crimes Act was challenged, approximately fifty
years later.50 In United States v. Kagama, the Court determined
that Congress had the authority to enact the Major Crimes Act.51
In reaching this decision, the Court stated that the United States
owes Indian tribes a “duty of protection” and, therefore, the
federal government has plenary authority over Indian country.52
Since this time, the federal government has exercised substantial
authority in Indian country.
Three cases demonstrate the modern application of the
federal trust responsibility to tribes: United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe,53 United States v. Navajo Nation,54 and
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation.55 In United States v.
White Mountain Apache, the Supreme Court considered a claim
brought by a federally recognized tribe alleging that the federal
government had failed to adequately manage Fort Apache for the
benefit of the tribe.56 The statute at issue required the federal
47. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1.
48. Id.
49. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 515.
50. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
51. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); see also Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
52. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 385.
53. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
54. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
55. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).
56. See generally White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465.
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government to hold Fort Apache in trust for the tribe and,
importantly, gave the federal government “authority to make
direct use of portion of the trust corpus.”57 As a result, the Court
determined that the tribe had sufficiently alleged a breach of
trust claim on a full trust (similar to the trust at issue in Mitchell
II), and awarded the tribe damages.58
In United States v. Navajo Nation, the Court did not find in
favor of the tribe.59 Here, the Navajo Nation alleged that the
Secretary of the Interior acted inappropriately in the negotiation
of mineral leases on the Navajo Nation.60 Ultimately, although
the Court acknowledged the unprofessional behavior of the
Secretary of the Interior, the Court held that the Navajo Nation
had failed to establish a full trust.61 This is because the statute
in question gave the tribe the right to negotiate leases and, as a
result, the Secretary of the Interior did not have full authority
over management of the resources in question.62
In both White Mountain Apache and Navajo Nation, the
Court seemed to focus its analysis on the amount of control
exercised by the federal government over the trust corpus in
question. Where the federal government had near complete
control over the trust corpus, as in White Mountain Apache, the
Court found in the tribe’s favor. However, where the statute in
question had given the tribe increased authority to negotiate

57. Id. at 475.
58. See id.
59. See generally Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488.
60. See id.; see also 149 CONG. REC. S7684 (daily ed. June 11, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman). At the time the TERA provisions were being
considered in Congress, the potential ramifications of the Navajo Nation
decision were of concern. For example, Senator Bingaman explained that:
Tribal concern is driven by a decision three months ago by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Navajo Nation. The
Supreme Court specifically addressed the Federal trust
responsibility and the standard for ensuring that statutes affecting
Native Americans contain fiduciary duties by which the Federal
Government as trustee can be held accountable for its actions that
may have serious and negative impacts on tribal interests.
Id.
61. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 514.
62. See id. at 511.
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leases, as in Navajo Nation, the Court found in favor of the
federal government.
On June 13, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United
States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation.63 The Court’s decision in
Jicarilla Apache Nation built on the Court’s past decisions
regarding the extent of the federal trust relationship in Mitchell
I, Mitchell II, Navajo Nation, and White Mountain Apache. The
issue before the Court concerned whether the common-law
fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege applied to the
United States when acting in its capacity as trustee for tribal
trust assets.64 In concluding that the fiduciary exception did not
apply, the Court explained that the federal government resembles
a private trustee in only limited instances.65 The Court reasoned
that “[t]he Government, of course, is not a private trustee.
Though the relevant statutes denominate the relationship
between the Government and the Indians is a ‘trust,’ see, e.g., 25
U.S.C. § 162a, that trust is defined and governed by statutes
rather than the common law.”66 Ultimately, the Court concluded
that while common law principles may “inform our interpretation
of statutes and [] determine the scope of liability that Congress
has imposed . . . the applicable statutes and regulations ‘establish
[the] fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the United
States’ fiduciary obligations.’”67 Based on the foregoing, the

63. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011). At issue
in the underlying litigation was the federal government’s management of the
Nation’s trust accounts from 1972 to 1992. Asserting the attorney-client
privilege and attorney work-product doctrine, the federal government declined
to turn over 155 documents requested by the Nation. The Nation filed a motion
to compel production, and the Court of Federal Claims granted the motion in
part. The Court of Federal Claims found that communication relating to the
management of the Nation’s trust funds fell within the “fiduciary exception” to
the attorney-client privilege, and, as a result, that these documents should be
produced. The federal government petitioned the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit with a writ of mandamus to prevent disclosure, but the Court of
Appeals upheld the Court of Federal Claims decision.
64. See id. at 2318.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 2323.
67. Id. at 2325 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983)). The
Court went on to explain that two features must exist in order for the commonlaw fiduciary exception to apply: (1) a “real client” and (2) duty to disclose
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Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to
determine whether the court’s decision had met the standards for
granting a writ of mandamus.
Whether or not the federal trust responsibility is consistent
with increased tribal sovereignty or self-determination turns on
how one conceives of the federal trust responsibility. On the one
hand, the federal trust responsibility, when considered as an
outgrowth of the Marshall trilogy of cases, may be perceived as a
doctrine to protect tribes from federal and state infringement into
internal tribal matters. 68 Alternatively, if based on the Kagama
line of cases, the federal trust responsibility may be seen as
“premised on dependency of tribes,” which supports continued
federal involvement in tribal matters.69
Both of these perspectives of the federal trust responsibility
are represented in comments made regarding the then-pending
TERA provisions. For example, Senator Campbell’s comments
and proposed amendment arguably represented the conception of
the federal trust responsibility as originating in the Marshall
trilogy of cases; Senator Bingaman’s comments and proposed
amendment generally represent the viewpoint that the federal
trust responsibility originates in the Kagama line of cases.
C. Comments from the TERA Legislative History
Related to the Federal Trust Relationship
A review of the legislative history suggests that some
commentators were concerned that the then-proposed TERA
provisions would negatively impact the federal government’s
trust responsibility to federally-recognized tribes.
These
comments are more fully discussed below. As an initial starting
point, The Department of Interior and former Senator Campbell
did not share this view. On March 19, 2003, Theresa Rosier,
Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs,
information regarding the trust, and concluded that the present case lacked
both factors. Id. at 2316.
68. Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility
with Self-Determination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on Development of the
Federal Trust Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
FOUND. J. 13A-1, 13A-32 (2005).
69. Id.
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Department of Interior, explained that the language in the bills
provided “a limited trust responsibility” on behalf of the federal
government to the tribes.70 On June 5, 2003, Senator Campbell
agreed with Ms. Rosier’s prior testimony that the TERA
provisions would not affect the federal government’s trust
responsibilities to federally recognized tribes.71
The majority of the comments related to the pending
legislation’s impact on the federal trust responsibility, however,
indicating a concern that the legislation would have a negative
impact. Some who testified before the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs expounded upon what the federal government’s
role under the TERA provisions should be, in light of the existing
federal trust responsibility to tribes. For example, David Lester,
Executive Director of the Council for Energy Resource Tribes,
stated that:
As we saw in the Navajo case, the companies have no obligation
to put all the information on the table for the tribes to know. We
believe that is a violation of the trust. We think that the trust
requires that the tribe be given assistance so that the

70. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 77
(statements of Sen. Inouye, Member, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, and Theresa
Rosier, Counselor to the Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Dep’t of Interior).
71. 149 CONG. REC. S7460 (daily ed. June 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Ben
Nighthorse Campbell) (“Section 2604 also discusses the Secretary’s trust
responsibility. It expressly states that the section does not absolve the United
States from that responsibility and expressly states that the Secretary will
continue to have a trust obligation to protect a tribe when another party to a
lease agreement or right-of-way is in breach.
It does not affect trust
responsibility at all.”).
It is notable that the contours of the federal trust responsibility to tribes
may have changed in the intervening years since these comments were made.
As discussed above, the Court explained in Jicarilla Apache Nation that the
federal government is only liable to tribes where a duty has been explicitly made
clear in a treaty or statute. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct.
2313, 2324-25 (2011). Accordingly, the language of the TERA provisions
becomes increasingly important in light of the Court’s recent decision in
Jicarilla Apache Nation, as the Court seems to suggest that the federal
government’s liability would be, in the case of TERAs, limited to the explicit
provisions of the TERA. It may therefore be the case that concerns raised
during the hearings and discussions of the TERA provisions before adoption of
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 would be magnified as a result of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jicarilla Apache Nation.
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asymmetrical nature of the negotiations is removed and we have
a level playing field.72

Some, such as Chairman Vernon Hill of the Eastern
Shoshone Business Council of the Wind River Indian Reservation,
believed that the TERA provisions amounted to a violation of the
federal government’s trust responsibilities to tribes.73 Perhaps
Rebecca L. Adamson, in an e-mail to Senator Campbell, summed
up these concerns best when she stated that “[t]hese bills appear
to be designed as tools for trust ‘reform’ either overtly, by
legislated abrogation of the government’s trust responsibility.”74
Moreover, as exemplified by the May 6, 2003 statement of
Senator Bingaman (included in the introduction to this Section),
at least one Senator was concerned that the proposed TERA
provisions represented a departure from the federal government’s
historic trust responsibility to tribes.75 Based on the foregoing,
except for a handful of commentators, most people who
commented on the then-pending TERA provisions and their
relationship to the federal trust responsibility seemed concerned
that such provisions would negatively impact the federal
government’s responsibility to federally recognized tribes.
D. Mandatory Tribal Environmental Review
In addition to concerns related to the status of the federal
trust relationship following passage of the TERA provisions,
commentators also expressed trepidation regarding the
mandatory environmental review provisions included in the thenpending Act. In testimony before the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs, Arvin Trujillo, Director of Navajo Natural
Resources, highlighted that federal control of tribal affairs, such
as mandating environmental review in Indian country, is at odds

72. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 88
(statement of David Lester, Executive Dir., Council for Energy Resource Tribes).
73. Id. at 118-20 (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, E. Shoshone Bus.
Council of the Wind River Indian Reservation).
74. Id. at 139 (statement of Rebecca L. Adamson, President, First Peoples
Worldwide).
75. 149 CONG. REC. S5751 (daily ed. May 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff
Bingaman).
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with Indian self-determination.76 During the same hearing,
Frank E. Maynes, tribal attorney for the Southern Ute Indian
Tribal Chairman, expounded on concerns surrounding a
federally-mandated process:
The leasing and rights-of-way proposals of both pieces of
legislation propose a trade that may be unacceptable to some
tribes. You eliminate the Secretarial approval in exchange for
tribes’ regulations that require consultation with State officials,
some type of public notification, and ultimately private citizen
challenges of approved leases and rights-of-way. Traditional
notions of tribal sovereignty protect tribes from incursion of
States and non-members in the decisionmaking process. The
Southern Ute Tribe believes this is the wrong approach. We
think that Congress should be concerned with whether or not the
tribes are capable of making informed decisions in the first place
and if they are capable of making those informed decisions, they
should take the responsibility for their mistakes as well as for
their goods decisions.77

Mr. Maynes went on to explain that the proposed TERA
provisions would treat tribal lands like public lands by essentially
mandating that tribes adopt NEPA-like environmental
regulations.78 Such mandatory regulations require tribes to
comply with environmental regulations not applicable to the
states.79

76. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 81
(statement of Arvin Truijillo, Dir., Navajo Natural Res.).
77. Id. at 84 (statement of Frank E. Maynes, Tribal Att’y, for the S. Ute
Indian Tribal Chairman, Howard D. Richards, Sr.).
78. Id. (“Tribes generally do not oppose Federal environmental laws. But the
proposed legislation shouldn’t treat tribal lands like public lands. For example,
NEPA requirements and public comment are inconsistent with the internal
decision-making aspect of tribal sovereignty.”); see also id. at 155 (statement of
Howard D. Richards, Sr., Chairman, S. Ute Indian Tribal Council).
79. Letter from Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, to Sen. Ben
Nighthorse Campbell (April 8, 2003), available at Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency
Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 109 (“Thus, the regulatory requirement in S. 522
as now drafted, since it would apply only to tribes, would actually be a step
backward away from self-determination because tribes would be held to
additional regulatory approval that states do not have to undergo.”) (emphasis
added).
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President Joe Shirley, Jr., of the Navajo Nation, shared these
concerns related to potential infringement on tribal sovereignty
in comments he submitted to the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs.80 He explained that such regulations were unnecessary
as they were largely duplicative of existing federal environmental
One
requirements already applicable in Indian country.81
commentator, after reviewing the applicable legislative history,
concluded that the mandated environmental review requirements
would be “contrary to the twin-goals of fostering tribal selfdetermination and promoting the efficient development of tribal
minerals.”82
Similarly, A. David Lester, Executive Director of the Council
of Energy Resources Tribes (CERT), explained CERT’s misgivings
regarding the mandatory environmental regulations:
One of our major concerns is the process that will be used to
challenge tribal decisions made under their own regulations.
These regulations provided for in both bills have a built-in
extensive environmental review process that involves public
notice and comment. Our view is that the right to appeal should
be very limited and that any overriding of tribal decisions should
be based on clear findings of failure of the tribe to follow its own
rules. S. 424 provides that only an “interested party” (a State or
a person whose interests may be adversely affected) can petition
the Secretary when a tribe allegedly violates its own siting
regulations.
The new section of S. 522 contains similar
requirements but appear to allow any person after exhaustion of
tribal remedies, with or without a nexus to the project, to petition
the Secretary for review of tribal compliance with its own
regulations. We believe this could cause great mischief for
Indian energy development and urge the Committee to revisit
this language.83

80. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 105
(statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation) (“[B]oth bills authorize
infringement of tribal sovereignty by subjecting internal tribal regulations to
the public notice and comment process through the federal register.”).
81. Id.
82. ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 9.
83. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 124
(statement of A. David Lester, Executive Dir., Council of Energy Resource
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Not all who commented on the then-pending TERA
provisions wanted to limit the mandatory environmental
regulations imposed on tribes. For example, Sharon Buccino, a
senior attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council,
wanted to see the goals and purposes of NEPA promoted and
protected through imposition of the TERA requirements on
tribes.84 Furthermore, Senator Bingaman explained that many
external parties, including national and local environmental
groups, the National Association of Counties, and a bipartisan
group of attorneys general from several states, seemed to strongly
support the imposition of mandatory environmental review
provisions on tribes entering into TERAs.85 He concluded that:
The concern expressed by those attorneys general and the
counties underscores the fact that without some applicable
Federal law related to the significant development activity
contemplated under this section 2604, it is unclear what
standard to apply.
. . . Tribal law can and should apply to energy development on
tribal lands, but at the same time Congress has a responsibility
to ensure that certain Federal parameters are in place.86

Tribes); see also id. at 159 (statement of Maynes, Bradford, Shipps & Sheftel,
LLP, Att’ys for the S. Ute Indian Tribe), stating:
Essentially, the measures propose the elimination of Secretarial
approval in exchange for the promulgation of tribal regulations that
not only require consultation with State officials, but also require
public notification and comment processes, and, ultimately, private
citizen challenges of approved leases or rights-of-way based on
allegations of non-compliance with tribal regulations. Traditional
notions of tribal sovereignty would protect tribes against the
incursion of State governments or the views of non-members in the
process of tribal decision-making. To ask tribes to forsake such a
fundamental aspect of sovereignty in exchange for the elimination of
Secretarial approval, may simply be too much for most tribes.
84. Id. at 150-51 (statement of Sharon Buccino, Senior Att’y, Natural Res.
Def. Council). Ms. Buccino actually went so far as to request that the
Committee add additional NEPA-like requirements to the then-proposed TERA
provisions.
85. 149 CONG. REC. S7684 (daily ed. June 11, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Bingaman).
86. Id.
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Potentially in response to these concerns, on June 11, 2003,
Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment to add the
mandatory environmental review provisions to the then-pending
TERA provisions.87
Senator Campbell opposed Senator Bingaman’s proposed
amendment, explaining that “[i]n my view, the Bingaman
amendment would literally strip tribes of 30 years of that
direction of self-determination and would circumvent the trust
responsibilities this Government has to tribes because it would
force the statutory equivalent of NEPA on all decisions they make
with their own land.”88
Senator Domenici shared Senator
Campbell’s concerns regarding the mandatory provisions in
Senator Bingaman’s proposed amendment, adding that “the
amendment before us takes the unprecedented step of applying
the NEPA process to the Indian tribes just as if they were the
Federal Government. This amendment goes well beyond current
environmental regulations and adds unnecessary regulations and
costs to the tribal energy project.”89
Accordingly,
the
legislative
history
demonstrates
commentators’ concern about potential encroachments into tribal
sovereignty and costs associated with the imposition of
mandatory environmental review through the TERA provisions.
These issues may explain in part tribes’ ongoing reluctance to
enter into TERAs.
E. Waiver of Federal Government’s Liability
As identified above, another concern of several commentators
on the then-pending TERA provisions related to the waiver of
federal government liability to third parties or tribes related to
matters arising after approval of a TERA. On June 5, 2003,
Senator Campbell explained the purpose of the liability waiver in
the then-pending TERA provisions:

87. Id.
88. Id. at S7,686 (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs).
89. Id.
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Section 2604 provides that the United States will not be liable to
any party, including a tribe, for losses resulting in the terms of
any lease agreements or right-of-way executed by the tribe
pursuant to the approved TERA, which makes sense; Liability
follows responsibility. If a tribe makes the leasing decisions, it
should certainly be held responsible. If the United States
continues to make the leasing decisions, it will continue to be
held responsible. If Indian self-determination means anything, it
means the right of tribes to make their own decisions and their
responsibility to the tribes to live with those decisions.90

Despite Senator Campbell’s sentiments, concerns regarding this
provision pervade the legislative history. Senator Bingaman
acknowledged that the TERA provision waiving the federal
government’s liability was controversial, in stating that “[t]here
are concerns with language in the bill that limits the liability of
the Federal Government with respect to leases and rights-of-way
approved by tribes under the citing provisions of the bill.”91
Chairman Vernon Hill shared this concern, explaining that given
the government’s pervasive role in energy development in Indian
country, tribes would be unlikely to release the federal
government from liability until the implications of the
streamlined process were clear.92 President Joe Shirley, Jr.,
shared and expounded upon the concerns raised by Chairman
Hill, explaining that:
Both bills [submitted by Senator Bingaman and Senator
Campbell] stipulate a waiver of federal liability, regardless of the
degree of managerial control exercised by the federal government
in Indian energy development. . . .
While these bills purport to put tribes in the driver seat of
decision making, they continue to empower the federal
government to act as the traffic cop who is authorized to put its
hand out to stop a tribe’s car from moving. Both bills ultimately

90. Energy Policy Act of 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S7461 (daily ed. June 5, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs).
91. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 75
(statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman).
92. Id. at 83 (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, E. Shoshone Bus. Council
of the Wind River Indian Reservation).
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preserve the federal government’s final authority over energy
leases. Such final authority constitutes the lead role. This
scheme, wherein a cabinet Secretary has prescriptive control over
decisions regarding Indian energy development, but no
subsequent liability, is an abdication of the federal trust
responsibility that is patently unfair to tribes.93

President Shirley’s comments also highlight the connection
between the federal trust relationship and concerns associated
with waiver of the federal government’s liability following
approval of TERAs.
Moreover, in comments submitted to the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs, Chairman Hill further explained that the thenproposed TERA regulations would disadvantage tribes that were
not in the financial position to assume greater liability.94
Conversely, the TERA provisions promote continued inequality
between tribes, as those in an economic position to take on
greater liability would be treated differently by the federal
government.95
In a letter from Jacqueline Johnson, Executive Director of
the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI),96 to Senator
Campbell, NCAI expressed discontent with the waiver of the
federal government’s liability, explaining that “[w]e shared in
their [tribes’ and tribal advocates’] concern regarding provisions
that significantly limit the United States’ liability and release the
Secretary of Interior from any accountability to Indian tribes for
93. Id. at 107 (statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation).
94. Id. at 118 (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, E. Shoshone Bus.
Council of the Wind River Indian Reservation) (“Our Tribes are concerned that
the streamlining proposals embodied in both bills would require participating
Indian tribes to absorb all of the costs and liability associated with approving
business leases and rights-of-way. Many direct service tribes may not be
prepared to assume these responsibilities and costs.”).
95. Id. at 155 (statement of Howard D. Richards, Sr., Chairman, S. Ute
Indian Tribal Council) (“Third, those tribes that are willing and able to proceed
without the supervision of the United States will be required to assume greater
responsibility for their actions, including their mistakes.”).
96. The National Congress of American Indians, founded in 1944, is the
oldest, largest and most representative American Indian and Alaska Native
organization serving the broad interests of tribal governments and communities.
See NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, http://ncai.org/ (last visited Mar.
23, 2012).
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actions that she is required to undertake pursuant to the
legislation.”97
Nonetheless, the legislative history suggests that some
individuals supported waiving the federal government’s liability
for actions taken by tribes under the TERA provisions. For
example, Theresa Rosier of the Department of Interior agreed
with then-Chairman Campbell that tribes should be liable where
they maintained managerial control over the resources at issue
and related decisions.98
However, notably, on June 11, 2003, Senator Bingaman
acknowledged that the waiver of the federal government’s
liability likely violated the federal trust responsibility. He stated
that:
Section 2604, the subject of our amendment here, as currently
drafted does not meet the standards established by the Supreme
Court. In fact, it goes in the opposite direction. It diminishes the
Federal Government’s trust responsibility and accountability to
tribes. This is inconsistent with the current Federal policy of
tribal self-determination and self-governance.99

In reaction to his belief that the then-proposed TERA provisions
violated the federal trust responsibility by waiving the federal
government’s potential liability, Senator Bingaman proposed to
amend the pending bill; his proposed amendment would have
eliminated the waiver of federal liability.100
Senator Campbell reacted powerfully to Senator Bingaman’s
proposed amendment, stating that:
I take strong issue with another aspect of the Bingaman
amendment having to do with the liability of the United States

97. Energy Policy Act of 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S7461 (daily ed. June 5, 2003).
The NCAI letter went on to explain that “we were not satisfied with provisions
pertaining to environmental review” as well.
98. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 96
(statements of Sen. Ben Night-Horse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, and Theresa Rosier, Counselor to the Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs,
Dep’t of Interior).
99. Energy Policy Act of 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S7684 (daily ed. June 11,
2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman).
100. Id. at S7685 (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman).
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for tribal decisions. Under title III [of the pending bill], along
with the power to create approved leases, agreements, and
rights-of-ways without Secretarial approval, the tribes have the
responsibility for the decisions they make.
Mr. Bingaman’s amendment in effect de-links the two,
eliminating the language that says the Secretary will not be
liable for losses arising under the terms of the leases the tribe
negotiates on its own. That would mean he would keep the
Secretary on the hook for those losses arising from lease terms
negotiated by the tribe, even though the Secretary has nothing to
do with the negotiations. I don’t think that is very good policy,
frankly.101

Despite Senator Campbell’s reaction to Senator Bingaman’s
proposed amendment, a review of the legislative history related
to this provision suggests that the majority of the commentators
were concerned that the waiver of the federal government’s
liability contained in the then-pending TERA provisions
amounted to an abrogation of the federal government’s trust
responsibility to federally recognized tribes. This concern, like
the issues previously examined, has likely contributed to tribes’
unwillingness to enter into a TERA.
F. Insights Gained from Legislative History
Generally, legislative history provides insight into the issues
considered by policy makers; the legislative history behind the
adoption of the TERA provisions is no different. The above
discussion sheds light on several points. As previously suggested,
the bulk of the comments associated with the TERA provisions
fall into three categories: (1) concerns related to the impacts of
the TERA provisions on the federal trust responsibility; (2)
concerns related to the imposition of an environmental review
program that must comply with federal mandates; and (3)
concerns related to the waiver of the federal government’s
liability.
Legislative history also aids in understanding the underlying
perspectives that contributed to the TERA provisions. The
101. Id. (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs).
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Bingaman and Campbell amendments discussed on June 11,
2003 are particularly notable in that they directly relate to the
proposals suggested below. Senator Bingaman’s amendment
arguably represents a paternalistic or federal-focused viewpoint.
As explained above, Senator Bingaman proposed an amendment
that would have essentially mandated that all tribes comply with
NEPA when developing energy projects in Indian country.
Senator Bingaman’s justification for this was that the federal
government has a responsibility to ensure that federal law was
applied in Indian country.
Senator Bingaman’s proposed
amendment would have also removed the general waiver of the
federal government’s liability from the TERA provisions. His
stated reason for advocating for the removal of this liability
waiver was that such a waiver violated the federal government’s
trust responsibility. These provisions of Bingaman’s proposed
amendment were legally consistent in that they represent the
viewpoint that the federal government should maintain a strong
presence or oversight role in Indian country.
Conversely, Senator Campbell’s proposed amendment
demonstrates a perspective focused on tribal self-determination
and sovereignty. In this regard, Senator Campbell opposed
imposition of NEPA-like environmental review mandates, as such
mandates would impose upon tribal sovereignty.
Senator
Campbell supported the general waiver of federal liability,
however, explaining that if tribes undertake greater decisionmaking authority, they should also take on potentially greater
liability. Senator Campbell’s proposed amendment, therefore, is
perhaps more consistent with tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination than Senator Bingaman’s amendment. These
themes will be revisited in Section V.
III.

TRIBES ARE WELL-POSITIONED TO TAKE THE
LEAD IN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

Section II of this article addressed the issues and concerns
raised during the federal government’s consideration of the TERA
provisions. In discussing this issue, one should consider whether
energy development in general – and the TERA provisions in
particular – are attractive from a tribal perspective; this Section
does so. Energy development not only benefits the United States
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as a whole but also has the potential to benefit Indian tribes.102
As explained more fully below, many tribes are well-positioned to
engage in energy development within their territories. Many
tribes are already participating in some form of energy
development, from natural resource extraction to energy
generation. As a result, this section considers potential benefits
for tribal communities from, and their demonstrated ability to
engage in, energy development.
Energy development within Indian country may bring muchneeded economic development and infrastructure to Indian
communities.103 “[U]ncertainty about both the marketplace and
policy gives Indian tribes a unique opportunity to become more
active in supporting policies and solutions that address their own
unique needs for infrastructure, diversification, and energy
security.”104 Recently, tribes have looked to diversify their

102. See DOUGLAS C. MACCOURT, RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN
COUNTRY: A HANDBOOK FOR TRIBES 2 (2010), providing:
In addition to the significant tribal control of land and resources in
the U.S. and the national focus on renewable energy, tribal interest
in renewable energy projects will also likely be fueled by each tribe’s
long-term goals relating to sovereignty, sustainability, and financial
security. In Indian country the past decade has brought with it a
renewed focus on tribal self-determination, with tribes asserting
more control over their land, resources and self-governance.
Renewable energy may support a wide range of tribal economic
activities, from tourism and gaming to manufacturing and
telecommunications. Many tribes have also begun to experiment
with their unique legal status to accelerate their economic
development efforts. Energy development is one way tribes are
creating the infrastructure and capacity to achieve economic
independence.
103. Angelique A. EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding
Commercial Prosperity in Spite of U.S. Trade Restraints – Recommendations for
Economic Revitalization in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383, 406 (2008);
LeBeau, supra note 3, at 42-43; Tracey A. LeBeau, Reclaiming Reservation
Infrastructure: Regulatory and Economic Opportunities for Tribal Development,
12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 238 (2001) (“Reservation infrastructures,
including basic services such as water, electricity, gas, and telecommunications,
are currently incapable of supporting tribal populations. The Census Bureau in
November 2000 reported that native populations will nearly double in the next
fifty years and might reach 4.4 million.”).
104. LeBeau, supra note 3, at, 38.
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economies105 in order to generate revenue and create jobs.106
Energy development, either through natural resource extraction
or energy generation, may play an important role in tribal
economies
as
many
tribes
move
toward
economic
diversification.107 Energy development is therefore an attractive
option for tribes interested in economic diversification.
In addition to promoting economic diversification within
tribes, energy development and generation may benefit tribal
communities by providing much needed energy itself to people
living on the reservations.108 As Senator Bingaman explained:
Although some of our reservations are rich in energy resources,
we have many people living on those reservations who, for
example, have no electricity. We need to help both in the

105. Financial Roundtable: Economic Diversification in Indian Country,
TRIBAL GOVERNMENT GAMING (Apr. 4, 2011), http://tribalgovernmentgaming.com/
issue/tribal-government-gaming-2011/article/financial-roundtable-economicdiversification-in-indian-country (last visited Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter
Financial Roundtable].
106. Id.; see also MICHAEL W. CAMERON, A PROTOTYPICAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FOR NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES (1990) (“As American
Indian tribes continue their efforts to advance reservation standards of living,
many are vigorously pursuing local economic development so as to provide
employment and training for their citizens and revenue for tribal government
programs.”).
107. See Leonard, supra note 18, at 630 (“Many states, municipalities, and
tribes now see renewable energy not only as a source of ‘green’ power but also as
a means of economic diversification. Given the momentum toward renewable
energy development, the time is ripe to implement such projects.”); Ernest
Stevens, Jr., The Next Wave: Tribal Economic Diversification, INDIAN GAMING 20
(Mar. 2007). Discussion of the appropriate business structure of such energy
development is beyond the scope of this article. Given the numerous variations
between tribal governments in Indian country, there are a multitude of options
available to tribal governments. For a discussion of the different economic and
business structures available to different tribal governments as well as a
recognition of the fact that each tribe may define a “successful enterprise”
differently, see Mary Emery et al., Economic Development in Indian Country:
Redefining Success, 4 ONLINE J. RURAL RES. & POL’Y 1 (2006).
108. Financial Roundtable, supra note 105 (“I have seen many tribes take the
approach to first seek opportunities to reduce costs by supplying their own
energy.”) (statement of Eric Trevan, President and CEO, National Center for
American Indian Enterprise Development).
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development of the resources and help to ensure that the benefits
of that development inures to the actual tribal members.109

Further, energy development in Indian country will lead to more
Indian
jobs for people living within Indian country.110
communities, many residents of which are poor, will benefit from
the increased availability of energy and jobs.111
Many tribes are currently engaged in some form of energy
development.112 A long history of energy development and
109. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 75
(statement of Sen. Bingaman).
110. See, e.g., id. at 71 (statement of Theresa Rosier, Counselor to the
Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Dep’t of the Interior) (“Increased energy
development in Indian country means increased jobs. In many Indian and
Alaska Native communities, joblessness and underemployment are painfully
acute. More than ever, tribes need the job and training opportunities that go
hand-in-hand with expanded mineral and energy development.”).
111. STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT, PATHWAYS FROM POVERTY:
DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 3-5
(1989); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The
Development Challenge in Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES.
J. 187, 189 (1998). See also 149 CONG. REC. S7459 (daily ed. June 5, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs), stating that:
Despite what we may read in the Washington Post or the New York
Times about the so-called rich Indians and Indian gambling, it is
also indisputable that Indians are the most economically-deprived
ethnic group in the United States. Unemployment levels are far
above the national average, in some cases as high as 70 percent. Per
capita incomes are well below the national average. They have
substandard housing, poor health, alcohol and drug abuse, diabetes,
amputations, and a general malaise and hopelessness, even suicide
among Indian youngsters.
112. Judith V. Royster, Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the
Problem of the Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 92 (2012)
(“Energy development is the economic lifeblood of many Indian tribes. A
number of tribal economies are heavily dependent upon fossil fuel extraction,
and for many tribes, fossil fuels are the single greatest source of tribal
revenue.”) (citing Tribal Development of Energy Resources and the Creation of
Energy Jobs on Indian Lands: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Indian and Alaska Native Affairs of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 112th
Cong. 44 (2011) (statement of Irene C. Cuch, Ute Tribal Business Committee)
(“[T]he Tribe’s primary source of income is from oil and gas.”)); Indian Energy
Development: Oversight Hearing Before S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong.
15 (2008) (testimony of Chairman Carl Venne, Crow Nation) (stating that “most
of our governmental revenue is derived from” mineral development); Tribal
Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 115 (statement of Vernon
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natural resource extraction exists in Indian country.113 Within
the past decade, tribes have increasingly tested their ability to
branch out from their historical practice of providing access to
energy resources through leases to third parties by selfdevelopment and management of energy resources. Moreover,
those outside of Indian country have increasingly expressed a
need for and interest in energy development within Indian
country.114 The list of existing and proposed tribal energy
projects extends from the proposed Navajo-owned wind farm
project in Arizona115 to the proposed coal-to-liquids and biomassto-liquids Many Stars Project on the Crow Reservation in
As a result of their historical and modern
Montana.116
experiences, tribes have a demonstrated record of energy
development. Today, many tribes are able to accomplish such
energy development in a sustainable manner, thereby reducing
further environmental degradation.117
Ultimately, energy development in Indian country is
attractive to many tribes because of the potential benefits to the

Hill, Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council of the Wind River
Reservation) (noting that oil and gas production “is the primary source of
revenue for the Tribes”); see also Mireya Navarro, Navajos Hope to Shift from
Coal to Wind and Sun, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2010, at A12, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/science/earth/26navajo.html?_r=l&emc=etal
(reporting that coal accounts for more than one-third of the Navajo Nation
operating budget, and is the largest source of revenue after government grants
and taxes); LeBeau, supra note 103, at 239.
113. For a discussion of the history of energy development and natural
resource extraction in Indian country, see Royster, supra note 13; LeBeau, supra
note 103.
114. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Alternative Energy Development in Indian Country:
Lighting the Way for the Seventh Generation, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 449, 459 (2010);
Leonard, supra note 18, at 630-31.
115. Navajo-owned Wind Farm in Works in Arizona, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
MEDIA NETWORK (Aug. 17, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
2011/08/navajo-owned-wind-farm-in-works-in-arizona/.
116. Project Overview, MANY STARS PROJECT, http://manystarsctl.com/
overview.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
117. See LeBeau, supra note 3, at 44 (“Numerous tribes share a common
cultural concept of walking in balance with the natural environment. Walking
‘the red road’ is a descriptive phrase that refers to the principle of walking the
road of balance – living right and following the rules of the creator, among
which is the need to take care of all living things so that they will, in turn, take
care of you.”). See also LeBeau, supra note 103, at 239.
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tribal community, as well as the ability to help the entire nation
meet its energy goals.118 Yet, despite the potential benefits and
the demonstrated ability to engage in energy development, not a
single Indian tribe has yet taken advantage of the “streamlining”
benefits available under the TERA provisions of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, as discussed above. Tribal governments’ lack
of interest in the TERA provisions of the Energy Policy Act of
2005 is perplexing. The ability of tribal governments to exercise
their sovereignty in a meaningful and stable manner increases
the likelihood of tribal economic development,119 something that
is crucial to tribal governments. Moreover, “TERAs offer the
potential to significantly improve investor confidence and
enhance the development of renewable energy projects on tribal
lands.”120
IV.

A THEORY: THREE FACTORS DISCOURAGE
TRIBAL ADOPTION OF TERAS

Given the potential benefits to Indian country available to
tribes through utilization of the TERA provisions, the fact that
tribes have not taken advantage of this opportunity is perplexing.
118. See Tribes Hope to Model Southern Ute’s Successful Energy Development,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Apr. 2, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.
com/2012/04/02/tribes-hope-to-model-southern-utes-successful-energydevelopment-106044; see also Leonard, supra note 18, at 636.
119. Cornell & Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building, supra note 111, at 18889, providing that:
But shaping those futures will require not simply the assertion of
sovereignty – a claim to rights and powers – it will require the
effective exercise of that sovereignty. The task tribes face is to use
the power they have to build viable nations before the opportunity
slips away. This is the major challenge facing Indian country today.
It also is the key to solving the seemingly intractable problem of
reservation poverty. Sovereignty, nation-building, and economic
development go hand in hand. Without sovereignty and nationbuilding, economic development is likely to remain a frustratingly
elusive dream.
A discussion of why tribal sovereignty is key to economic development in Indian
country is beyond the scope of this article. For a complete discussion, see
generally id. Furthermore, for a discussion of how the promotion of tribal
sovereignty is critical to natural resource development in Indian country, see
Royster, supra note 13.
120. Clary, supra note 15, at 23.
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The fact that tribes apparently requested streamlined procedures
from the federal government,121 but yet have failed to take
advantage of the streamlined provisions of TERAs122 compounds
the oddness of this turn of events. According to the Department
of the Interior, “several tribes have expressed interest in
obtaining information about Tribal Energy Resource Agreements
(TERAs) and the TERA regulatory process, but that as of
[December 1, 2010], no tribes had submitted a request to the
Department to enter into a TERA.”123 On May 7, 2012, a
representative of the Bureau of Indian Affairs confirmed that
“[t]o date the Secretary has received no TERA applications and no
TERAs have been approved.”124 Moreover, the stated purpose of
Title V of the Energy Policy Act, which contains the TERA
provisions, was to attract energy development to Indian
country,125 but it has failed to do so. As exemplified by the

121. LeBeau, supra note 5, at 44 (“Streamlining regulatory approvals related
to leasing and/or joint development of energy projects on tribal lands has also
become a pressing issue, because most projects involving renewable energy
resources that are sited on Indian lands usually require approval by the
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, a process that
necessitates contingent National Environmental Policy Act reviews and
approvals.”).
122. It may be that some tribes are interested in pursuing TERAs. Royster,
supra note 112, at 119. For example, the Sac and Fox Nation may be interested
in pursuing a TERA in order to aid in the construction of a refinery. Miles,
supra note 8, at 475. However, as of May 7, 2012, no tribe had submitted an
application to enter into a TERA with the Department of Interior. See infra
note 124 and accompanying text; Royster, supra note 112, at 119 (citing 157
CONG. REC. S6463 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2011) (statement of Sen. Barrasso);
Discussion Draft of the Indian Energy Promotion and Parity Act of 2010,
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 10 (2010), at 19-20
(statement of Hon. Matthew J. Box, Chairman, Southern Ute Indian Tribe)
(noting that although the tribe was a “vigorous supporter” of ITEDSA, neither it
nor any other tribe has entered into a TERA because of the difficulties and
uncertainties involved); Ryan David Dreveskracht, Economic Development,
Native Nations, and Solar Projects, 34 J. ENERGY & DEV. 141, 150 (2011); Letter
from Stephen Manydeeds, Acting Dir., Office of Indian Energy & Econ. Dev.,
Dep’t of Interior, to author (Dec. 1, 2010) (on file with author).
123. Letter from Stephen Manydeeds to author, supra note 122.
124. E-mail from Catherine Freels, Bureau of Indian Affairs, to author (May 7,
2012) (on file with author).
125. Miles, supra note 8, at 474 (citing Scot W. Anderson, Remarks at the
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Inst., Special Inst. on Natural Res. Dev. in Indian
Country: The Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of
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legislative history detailed above, it appears that tribes may have
declined to enter into TERAs because of concerns associated with
the federally-mandated environmental review program and the
potential impact of the waiver of federal government liability,126
which in turn may have implications related to the federal trust
relationship.
The waiver of federal liability is itself somewhat of a
conundrum, as the Secretary is directed to “act in accordance
with the trust responsibility” and “act in good faith and in the
best interests of the Indian tribes.”127 The Act provides that
nothing contained within it “shall absolve the United States from
any responsibility to Indians or Indian tribes.”128 Yet, at the
same time, the provisions state that “the United States shall not
be liable to any party (including any Indian tribe) for any
negotiated term of, or any loss resulting from the negotiated
terms” of an agreement entered into under the tribe’s TERA.129
Although perhaps not directly contradictory, these provisions are
not entirely consistent with one another, as demonstrated by
many of the comments highlighted above. As was explained by
President Joe Shirley, Jr. of the Navajo Nation, the general
waiver provisions of TERA are inconsistent with the federal trust
responsibility and “is an abdication of the federal trust
responsibility that is patently unfair to tribes.”130
2005: Opportunities for Cooperative Ventures (Nov. 10, 2005) (transcript on file
with the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Inst.)).
126. The author recognizes that the waiver of federal liability may be only one
of the reasons tribes have failed to take advantage of the TERA provisions, as
exemplified by the above discussion. Another potential reason for the lack of
tribal participation may be the cumbersome application process. Unger, supra
note 15, at 359. Another reason that tribes have declined to enter into TERAs
may be because of a lack of adequate funding. Bethany C. Sullivan, Changing
Winds: Reconfiguring the Legal Framework for Renewable-Energy Development
in Indian Country, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 832 (2010). Finally, tribes may have
failed to date to take advantage of the TERA provisions because of concerns
associated with being the first to do so. However, because the comments
included in the applicable legislative history seemingly focused on the three
categories discussed above, those categories are the focus of this article.
127. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(A) (2006).
128. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(B)
129. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii).
130. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 107
(statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation).
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Furthermore, under the existing TERA provisions, tribes are
increasingly seeing the cost of energy development being shifted
to themselves.131 This issue dovetails into concerns associated
with the federally mandated environmental review provision,
which places additional regulatory burdens on tribes without
providing financial resources.
Accordingly, given that the above aspects of the TERA likely
serve as impediments to tribes entering into TERAs, reform is
necessary to address these concerns. In considering potential
revisions to the TERA provisions, one should keep in mind the
perspectives of Senators Bingaman and Campbell discussed
above.
The options for reform may be reflective of the
perspectives articulated by Senators Bingaman and Campbell,
one of which represents a vision that encompasses a stronger role
for the federal government in Indian country and the other which
represents a vision that encompasses a stronger opportunity for
tribes to express their sovereignty and self-determination. Both
of these options are discussed below.
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO SPUR TRIBAL
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT UNDER TERAS

Notably, the Obama Administration may be receptive to
potential options to reform the TERA provisions. The current
Administration has generally been open to hearing previous calls
for reform from Indian country.132 As explained in Section II of
this paper, America needs to diversify its energy portfolio, and
Indian country will likely play a role in increased domestic
production of energy. However, as President Joe Shirley, Jr.
explained, tribes are unlikely to “opt in” to the existing TERA
131. See Royster, supra note 112, at 1099 (explaining that:
Tribes are concerned that all the costs of energy development are
being shifted onto them without sufficient resources to meet those
costs. Tribes will absorb the costs – both direct and indirect – of
preparing TERAs, negotiating leases, agreements, and rights-of-way,
conducting environmental reviews, and responding to challenges by
“interested parties.” Grant funds will be available to offset some of
the costs, and the Department of the Interior is instructed to assist
with advice and expertise to the extent it can. But inevitably tribes
will bear substantial costs.).
132. Dreveskracht, supra note 122, at 141-42; LeBeau, supra note 3, at 44.
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provisions, for the reasons articulated above.133 Even Congress
seems to recognize the necessity of reform. In 2009, Senator
Bryon Dorgan (D-ND), Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs, and Senator John Barrasso (R-WY), Vice
Chairman of the Committee, released a concept paper on energy
In
development and efficiency within Indian country.134
recognizing the need for reform, the concept paper identified
“outdated laws and cumbersome regulations for tribal energy
development and programs” as one of the three areas where
reform was necessary.135 Ultimately, following the release of the
concept paper and numerous follow-up hearings, legislation was
proposed to amend the TERA provisions; however, none of this
legislation was enacted.136 As a result, reform is still very much
needed.137
133. Letter from Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, to Sen. Ben
Nighthorse Campbell (Apr. 8, 2003); see also Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act
Hearing, supra note 12, at 110 (statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo
Nation).
This waiver could actually undermine the concept of tribal selfdetermination by making it clear to non-Indian developers that the
United States would no longer be held responsible for energy deals
gone bad. . . . Furthermore, there is no rationale for the federal
liability waiver if the ultimate responsibility for the final regulatory
framework controlling the development project still remains with the
Secretary, as provided for in Section 2605(e). Such a scheme could
perpetuate the lose-lose paradigm in which tribes have been trapped
for too long. Accordingly, why would any tribe want to “opt in”?
Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 110 (statement of
Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation).
134. Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs,
Dorgan and Barrasso Release Concept Paper on Indian Energy and Energy
Efficiency (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/news/
pressreleases/2009-09-10.cfm.
135. Id.
136. See Royster, supra note 112, at 120-21, explaining that:
The Committee held a follow-up hearing in 2009, and from that
emerged the proposed Indian Energy Parity Act (IEPA) of 2010,
which contained amendments to the TERA process. The IEPA was
referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, which took no action on
the bill before the end of the session. In October 2011, Senator
Barrasso introduced the Indian Tribal Energy Development and
Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2011. In addition, the
proposed HEARTH Act, which would amend the surface leasing
process to include a TERA-like process, was introduced in 2010 and
referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. Although the
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The discussion below offers two suggestions for reform.
These options, though somewhat contradictory, would both
improve upon the existing TERA regulations. Whether one
proposal is found more persuasive than the other may turn
“partly on how one conceptualizes the trust doctrine. It can be
seen as a federal duty to protect tribes’ right of self-governance
and autonomy, or as a way to justify federal power and control
over tribal affairs.”138 Senators Bingaman’s and Campbell’s
comments on the then-pending TERA provisions exemplify this
difference of viewpoint on the federal government’s trust
responsibility to federally-recognized tribes.
The first proposal approaches the federal trust responsibility
from the perspective of promoting tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination: the TERA regulations maintain federal decisionmaking authority over energy development in Indian country,
which is unnecessary and perhaps even detrimental to the
overarching goal of tribal self-determination and energy
development. Alternatively, the second proposal for reform
adopts a “federal” or “paternalistic” perspective of the federal
trust responsibility: the federal government maintains a
significant role in energy development in Indian country and
therefore should be liable for decisions made under TERA
(presumably to protect the economic stability of tribal
governments). In considering these proposals, one must be
mindful of the fact that the role of the federal government in
tribal decision-making is a hotly contested issued.139 Moreover,
these two options for reform are presented in recognition of the
existing trade-offs between the tribal trust responsibility and full
tribal sovereignty. As Professor Ezra Rosser explained, “[t]he
challenge for Indian scholars and leaders alike is recognizing that
the future of tribal progress will involve a trade-off between selfCommittee approved the bill, the Senate did not act on it before the
end of session. (citations omitted).
137. Scholars and commentators have also called for reform of the TERA
provisions. For example, Professor Judith Royster proposes reforms focused on
the Secretarial approval process. Royster, supra note 112, at 127-37. For a
discussion of the reforms needed to spur energy development in Indian country,
see generally Sullivan, supra note 126.
138. Unger, supra note 15, at 340-41.
139. Sullivan, supra note 126, at 831.
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determination and the trust duties of the federal government.”140
Interestingly, the Navajo Nation made similar recommendations
to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in comments
submitted in 2003.141
A. One Potential Avenue for Effective Reform:
Empower Tribal Governments to Make Decisions
Regarding Energy Development Without
Intervention from the Federal Government
If Congress truly wishes the federal government to be free
from liability with regard to certain types of energy development
within Indian country, the TERA provision waiving federal
government liability may remain. However, to maximize energy
development within Indian country and truly promote tribal selfdetermination as is the stated goal of the Act, the federal
government should remove some or all federal “conditions” on
such development.142 This is consistent with the viewpoint
expressed by Senator Campbell and discussed above; if tribes are
to be sovereign, they must have control over regulation within
their territories and also bear the liability for tribal decisionmaking.143 This means that federal mandates, such as the
140. Ezra Rosser, The Trade-Off Between Self-Determination and the Trust
Doctrine: Tribal Government and the Possibility of Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291,
295 (2005). Notably, it may be the case that the level of acceptable “trade off”
will differ between individual tribes, as some tribes are in the position to take
increased responsibility, which may come with the “trade off” of decreased
federal responsibility.
141. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 107
(statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation); see also id. at 120
(statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, E. Shoshone Bus. Council of the Wind
River Indian Reservation) (“The bills should be amended to provide Indian
tribes adequate resources to assume these comprehensive federal
responsibilities. Providing these resources is consistent with the federal trust
responsibility and comports with the longstanding policies supporting and
promoting tribal self-determination and tribal energy self-sufficiency.”).
142. This proposal is also somewhat consistent with legislation that has been
previously proposed, as discussed above. This is because the previously
proposed legislation would have modified the existing environmental review
process. See Royster, supra note 112, at 125-27.
143. This also addresses the concern that decreased interest in energy or
mineral development under any of the existing applicable statutes in Indian
country is likely due in part to the fact that Indian tribes cannot generally play
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mandates listed in the existing TERA provisions related to
environmental review, should be removed.144 Moreover, under
the current provisions, “the government’s significant involvement
in the approval process could be interpreted as an infringement
on tribal self-sufficiency and sovereignty.”145 As previously
discussed, many tribes and tribal representatives expressed
strong concerns about federally-mandated environmental review
provisions that would potentially disrupt tribal governance and
subject tribal governments to standards not applicable to the
states.146 Such reform would empower tribes to become the true
decision-makers with regard to energy development under the
TERA provisions. The proposed reform offers several benefits.
First, tribes empowered as true decision-makers tend to perform
better.147 Acting as decision-makers allows tribes to exercise
their sovereignty, which as discussed above is tied to the overall
likelihood of tribal economic success. In order for a tribe to
exercise its sovereignty as a “true” decision-maker, the federal
government must play a lesser role in making decisions affecting

an active role in such development. Id. at 114-15. By decreasing the role of the
federal government, the first option for reform therefore increases the likelihood
that Indian tribes will take an increased role in energy development, which as
explained herein increases the likelihood of a successful project.
144. As previously discussed, some may oppose reform of the TERA provisions
that would remove the federally-mandated environmental review process. See
e.g., Miles, supra note 8, at 472.
It is important to note, however, that several tribes have elected to adopt
NEPA-like Tribal Environmental Policy Acts in order to review tribal actions.
See Royster, supra note 13, at 1093-94. Moreover, although this article argues
for removal of the federally-mandated environmental review process as an
aspect of this particular reformation of the TERA provisions, the federal
government through the Secretary of Interior would still have an opportunity to
review and approve a TERA before it is put in place. Accordingly, should
concerns arise regarding a particular tribe’s environmental record, such
concerns could be aired and addressed during the notice-and-comment process
associated with approval of the tribe’s TERA application.
145. Miles, supra note 8, at 467.
146. Id. at 1068-90 (citation omitted); see generally supra Section III.B.
147. Royster, supra note 13, at 1068-69 (citation omitted). Professor Royster
points out that successful tribal economic development without meaningful
practical sovereignty (i.e., the ability to act as a sovereign within one’s territory)
is rare. Id. at 1069.
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development within Indian country.148 In fact, scholars have
deduced that “federal control over economic decision-making is
‘the core problem in the standard approach to development and a
primary hindrance to reservation prosperity’.”149
Tribes that have undertaken increased decision-making roles
have a demonstrated record of success, as exemplified by tribal
forest management under Public Law No. 638. Under P.L. 638,
tribes may enter into contracts and self-governance compacts to
assume administration of federal Indian programs, and may use
the 638 program to gain significant control over natural resources
development. For example, a statistical analysis of seventy-five
forestry tribes showed that in the 1980s, forty-nine of the tribes
used the 638 program to take some degree of management over
their forest resources. The study concluded that “tribal control of
forestry under P.L. 638 results in significantly better timber
management.”150 When tribes took complete management over
their forest resources under 638, output rose as much as forty
percent with no increase in the number of workers, and the tribes
received prices as much as six percent higher than they had when
the forest resources were managed by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs.151 Empirical proof exists that, at least in the context of
forest management (which is analogous to energy development
given both involve the development of natural resources), tribes
have demonstrated the ability to excel when allowed to exercise
increased decision-making authority.
As Professor Royster
concludes, “[t]ribal control of federal programs is thus better than
federal control, but a clear second-best to tribal choices of what
programs and development opportunities.”152 By eliminating the

148. Id. (“Practical sovereignty, no less than political sovereignty, requires
reducing the role of the federal government.”).
149. Id. at 1069 (citing Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to
Economic Development on American Indian Reservations: One Works, the Other
Doesn’t 18 (Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, No. 2005-02, 2006),
available at http://www.jopna.net/pubs/jopna_2005-02_Approaches.pdf ).
150. Id. at 1070 (citations omitted).
151. Id. Professor Royster hypothesizes that the general lack of litigation
surrounding mineral leases under the Indian Mineral Development Act suggests
that tribes are doing a good job of managing mineral resources under this Act,
which gives tribes increased access to practical sovereignty as well. Id. at 1077.
152. Id. at 1070.
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requirement that tribes entering into a TERA come into
compliance with a federally-mandated environmental review
process, tribes would, therefore, have increased decision-making
authority, which in turn increases practical sovereignty that has
been shown to increase the likelihood of success of a project.
Furthermore, reduction of the federal government’s role in
energy development within Indian country correlates with the
federal government’s goal to promote tribal self-determination.153
Although some tribes may not be in a position to take an
increased role in decision-making within their territories, those
that are in the position should be encouraged to take an
increasingly active role, thereby empowering the appropriate
tribes to be self-determinating.154 The failure of the federal
government to recognize that many tribes are capable of
independent decision-making would see tribal nations “frozen in a
perpetual state of tutelage.”155
Also, the additional environmental requirements heaped on
tribes through the TERA provisions are more extensive than
those required of state governments.
State and local
governments are not required to comply with NEPA nor with a
NEPA-like requirement, and therefore placing such a
requirement on tribal governments would be odd.156 In fact, the
environmental review requirements placed on tribes under the
TERA provisions likely go beyond the requirements placed on the

153. The federal government has arguably had a policy in place to promote
tribal self-determination since President Nixon first issued a statement to
Congress addressing tribal self-determination. See Special Message to Congress
on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970) (“The time has come to break
decisively with the past and to create the conditions for a new era in which the
Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions . . . .”).
154. Increased decision-making authority leads to increased tribal economic
independence and stronger tribal governance. Unger, supra note 15, at 337.
155. Thomas H. Shipps, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: A Step Toward
Self-Determination, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2007, at 55-56.
156. Unger, supra note 15, at 353 (“After the Indian Energy Act was passed,
one commentator notes that state and local governments are not subject to
NEPA review requirements and argued that the TERA environmental review
requirement is ‘more intrusive on the government prerogatives of Indian tribes
than justified.’”) (citations omitted).
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federal government.157
The need to subject tribes to a
requirement more rigorous than that applicable to the federal
government – and one that is not placed at all on state and local
governments – is dubious at best.
Moreover, concerns regarding federal conflicts of interest
exist within Indian country. “[A] question arises concerning
whether the Secretary is acting in the tribe’s interest or the
United States’ interest when reviewing an EIS and approving or
disapproving a development lease.”158 For example, in Navajo
Nation, the Navajo Nation brought suit, alleging that the federal
government had failed to protect the interests of the Nation in
part because of conflicting obligations.159 The federal government
has generally failed to provide adequate oversight to effectively
manage resource development in Indian country.160
Some may find this suggested reform – removing the
mandated environmental review – objectionable, on the basis that
tribal environmental review would no longer be required should
the proposed reform be adopted.161
However, the federal
government would still be required to complete an environmental
review under NEPA before a tribal TERA may be approved,
which should allay some concerns.162 Moreover, a TERA would
157. Id. at 354 (“The Secretary has acknowledged that the TERA
environmental review provisions go beyond what NEPA requires of the federal
government.”).
158. Miles, supra note 8, at 467.
159. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
160. See Shipps, supra note 154, at 56 (providing that:
Putting philosophy aside, based on past practices, Congress will
never commit the resources needed to provide comprehensive,
timely, and high-quality expertise to tribes as they evaluate and
undertake mineral development. The fragmentation of federal
oversight institutionalized in the discrete functions performed by the
BIA, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Minerals
Management Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency
dilutes consistent and efficient resource management.).
161. See supra notes 84 and 85; Miles, supra note 8, at 463-64.
162. Miles, supra note 8, at 466.
The Secretary’s authority, however, to require an EIS under NEPA
rests on the trustee relationship, not on federal ownership of the
land, unlike traditional NEPA mandates. Neither Indians nor
Indian land is mentioned in the text of NEPA or in its legislative
history. . . . The courts, however, have held that NEPA applies to
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only be approved for a period of years, allowing the federal
government to evaluate the environmental impact of projects
undertaken by tribes under TERAs after the expiration of the
approval period. If, following federal re-review, it is determined
that the tribe has acted in an environmentally risky manner, the
federal government may decline to enter into a subsequent TERA
with the tribe.
In sum, this proposal for reform would keep the existing
general waiver of federal liability in the TERA revisions, but
remove the federal mandates placed on tribes – notably, the
federally-mandated environmental review and administrative
provisions. This proposal is preferable to the existing scheme in
that it would empower tribes to be true decision-makers as to
matters affecting their territory. As seen above, tribes have a
demonstrated record of success when serving as primary decisionmakers. Moreover, the proposed reform would promote tribal
sovereignty and self-determination, which is a stated goal of the
Act. For these reasons, the proposed reform represents an
improvement over the existing TERA provisions.
B. An Alternative Possibility for Reform: Reinstate
Federal Liability under the TERA Provisions
As an alternative, a second recommendation for reforming
the existing TERA provisions would call for reinstatement of
federal liability so as to increase tribal participation in TERAs.
This second proposal is also an improvement over the status quo
in that it will (with any luck) alleviate tribal concerns related to
the federal government’s responsibility to tribes. Such a revision
would arguably be consistent with the federal government’s trust
responsibility to tribes. As “the ability to hold the federal
government liable for breach is at the heart of its trust obligation
toward tribes,”163 the waiver of federal governmental liability
leases between Indians and private parties that are subject to
approval by the federal government. . . . One year after NEPA was
enacted, Congress clarified that when approving Indian leases, the
Secretary must consider ‘the effect on the environment for the uses
to which the leased lands will be subject.’
Id. (citations omitted).
163. Unger, supra note 15, at 342.
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seems to be inconsistent with this federal trust obligation.
Removing the waiver would also allay fears that “private entities
such as energy companies will exploit tribal resources and take
unfair advantage of tribes.”164 This is because the federal
government would likely maintain a more active role in energy
development under TERAs. Moreover, this proposal would likely
be consistent with the federal viewpoint, such as the one
expressed by Senator Bingaman, which envisions the federal
government maintaining a significant role in Indian country.
Congress apparently intended the TERA provisions to be
consistent with the federal government’s trust responsibility to
tribes. For example, one subsection of the TERA provisions refers
specifically to the federal trust responsibility, affirming that the
trust responsibility remains in effect. This provision mandates
that the Secretary “act in accordance with the trust responsibility
of the United States relating to mineral and other trust resources
. . . in good faith and in the best interests of the Indian tribes.” It
also notes that with the exception of the waiver of Secretarial
approval allowed through the TERA framework, the Indian
Energy Act does not “absolve the United States from any
responsibility to Indians or Indian tribes, including . . . those
which derive from the trust relationship.”165
In addition to apparent consistency with the federal trust
responsibility, federal liability under the TERA provisions is
appropriate given that the federal government maintains a
significant role in the development of energy within Indian
country even under the TERA agreements. For example, under
the TERA provisions, the federal government retains “inherently
Federal functions.”166 Moreover, as discussed above, the federal
government maintains a significant oversight role through the
existing TERA provisions because it has a mandatory
environmental review process which tribes must incorporate into
TERAs. The failure to relinquish oversight to tribes ensures that
the federal government will maintain a strong management role,
even after a tribe enters into a TERA with the Secretary of the

164. Id. at 354.
165. Id. at 350 (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 356.
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Interior.
Given that the federal government maintains a
substantial oversight role under the TERA provisions (which it
views as consistent with its federal trust responsibility), the
federal government should remain liable for decisions made
under TERAs. In addition to the strong administrative role that
the federal government would still play under approved TERAs,
it also maintains an important role as a tribal “reviewer.” Under
the TERA provisions, the federal government must review the
tribe’s performance under the TERA on a regular basis.167
Although the existing TERA provisions certainly mark an
increased opportunity for tribes to participate in decision-making
related to energy development within Indian country, the federal
government’s role should remain significant. The proposal to
reinstate federal liability under the TERA provisions, therefore,
recognizes the significant role that the federal government still
plays under the existing TERA provisions.
If Senator Bingaman’s viewpoint is any indication, Congress
may be unwilling to relinquish federal oversight over energy
development within Indian country. As a result, the first
proposal for reform discussed above may prove to be unacceptable
to Congress. Assuming this is the case, this second proposal
allows the federal government to maintain an oversight role in
Indian county and reinstates the federal government’s liability.
Based on the legislative history detailed above, reinstatement of
the federal government’s liability would likely address many of
the concerns raised by tribes regarding the existing TERA
provisions.
In this way, this second proposal would also
constitute an improvement over the status quo.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For a variety of reasons, America needs to increase energy
production from domestic sources. Indian tribes may prove the
perfect partners for the federal government to achieve its goal of
increased domestic production of energy. These tribes have the
available natural resources, and experience managing these
resources, to make them excellent partners. Increased energy

167. 25 C.F.R. § 224, subpart F (2012).
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production within Indian country would serve federal interests
and tribal interests, as such endeavors would increase tribal
sovereignty and self-determination while promoting economic
diversification within Indian country. Congress recognized this
potentially beneficial relationship with tribes when it passed the
TERA provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The existing
TERA provisions arguably “streamline” the process of energy
production within Indian country. Under these provisions, tribes
that enter into a TERA with the Secretary of Interior may be
relieved of Secretarial oversight in certain regards. Despite the
benefits of such “streamlining,” at the time of this writing, no
tribe has entered into a TERA agreement with the Secretary of
Interior.
In an effort to understand the potential reasons for lack of
tribal engagement with TERA, this article has explored the
legislative history associated with the TERA provisions. A review
of the legislative history has illustrated that concerns related to
the then-pending TERA provisions generally fell into three
categories: (1) concerns associated with the federal government’s
trust responsibility to tribes; (2) concerns associated with
federally-mandated environmental review provisions; and (3)
concerns associated with the general waiver of federal liability.
Based on the review of applicable legislative history and the
concerns expressed therein, this article proposes reform of the
TERA provisions.
In particular, this article proposes two
potential reforms. The first represents a tribal sovereignty
perspective. Under the first proposal, the tribes should be liable
(i.e., a waiver of federal government liability should be
maintained) only if tribes are the true decision-makers. In this
regard, the first proposal argues for the removal of federal
mandates, such as the conditions of environmental review and
administrative oversight. The reform would allow tribes to truly
make decisions regarding energy development within their
territories.
Because Congress may not accept this proposal, the article
also proposes an option for reform that maintains the federal
mandates and oversight role of the federal government, but
reinstates the federal government’s liability under the TERA
provisions. Such a reinstitution of federal liability is consistent
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with the federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes.
Although the two proposals are contradictory, both represent
improvements over the status quo and, should either be adopted
by Congress, would encourage tribes to enter into TERAs with
the Secretary of Interior.
The historical relationship between the federal government
and tribes is replete with examples of abuse and exploitation.
The TERA provisions represent a rare opportunity for both the
federal government and tribes to benefit from one another. Yet,
the TERA provisions in their current configuration fail to induce
such a partnership. By adopting one of the proposed reforms,
Congress would take a significant step toward building a
productive relationship with Indian tribes.
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